McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney MIRIAM R. HINMAN Assistant United States Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2700 Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff 6 United States of America 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 CASE NO. 2:20-CR-00007 JAM 12 Plaintiff. STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 13 FINDINGS AND ORDER v. STEVEN MICHAEL ROBERTS. 14 DATE: November 3, 2020 TIME: 9:30 a.m. 15 Defendant. COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez 16 This case is set for a status conference on November 3, 2020. On May 13, 2020, this Court 17 issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California "until 18 further notice." Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court's declaration of judicial emergency 19 under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this 20 Court's judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a 21 date after May 2, 2021. This and previous General Orders, as well as the declarations of judicial 22 emergency, were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 23 Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 24 25 concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record 26 27 <sup>1</sup> A judge "may order case-by-case exceptions" at the discretion of that judge "or upon the

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order

will impact court staff and operations." General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020).

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

## Case 2:20-cr-00007-JAM Document 36 Filed 11/02/20 Page 2 of 5

findings" in a particular case. *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). <sup>2</sup> If continued, this Court should designate a new date

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make "additional findings to support the exclusion" at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

## **STIPULATION**

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 3, 2020.
- 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 15, 2020, and to exclude time between November 3, 2020, and December 15, 2020, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4].
  - 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
  - a) On January 16, 2020, the government produced four disks of discovery to defense counsel, which included documents, photos, and audio and video recordings.
  - b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the discovery and to consult with her client about the case. The defendant was released to a 90-day residential treatment program on March 2, 2020, which he completed on June 1, 2020. Counsel for the defendant informed the government that the defendant's participation in the treatment program made communication between counsel and the defendant difficult, and the defendant was focused on completing his treatment program. Defense counsel would like additional time to meet with her client to go over discovery and discuss the case. As described below, the COVID-19 pandemic has also been making it difficult for defense counsel to meet with her client.
  - c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
    - d) The government does not object to the continuance.
  - e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and declarations of judicial emergency, and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because the combination of the pandemic and the defendant's participation in residential drug treatment has delayed counsel's ability to

## Case 2:20-cr-00007-JAM Document 36 Filed 11/02/20 Page 4 of 5

become familiar with the case and her client. State and local public health orders have directed residents of Sacramento County to minimize personal contacts in recent months. Defense counsel wishes to conduct further in-person meetings with her client to discuss the case and go over documents.

f)

Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the

- f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
- g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 3, 2020 to December 15, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
- 4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: October 30, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney

/s/ MIRIAM R. HINMAN
MIRIAM R. HINMAN
Assistant United States Attorney

## Case 2:20-cr-00007-JAM Document 36 Filed 11/02/20 Page 5 of 5

/s/ CHRISTINA SINHA Dated: October 30, 2020 CHRISTINA SINHA Counsel for Defendant Steven Michael Roberts FINDINGS AND ORDER IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 30th day of October, 2020. /s/ John A. Mendez THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE